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I. Introduction 
 In recent years, prenuptial agreements1 have gained popularity.2 This had been attributed 
to, among other things, widespread media attention and acceptance, as well as the recent 
economic downturn and each individual’s desire to maintain control of his or her assets.3 
However, despite this increase in acceptance, fewer than ten percent of newlyweds sign 
prenuptial agreements.4 Though some critics have suggested that this occurrence is due to the 
lack of predictability in enforcement, studies have shown that it is more likely that the 
combination of optimism bias and the lack of knowledge regarding rights upon divorce play a 
larger role in this phenomenon.5 
 Though the proportion of couples signing prenuptial agreements is still low, the fact that 
anyone is contracting regarding rights upon divorce is a recent phenomenon.6 Until the mid-
1970s, prenuptial agreements contracting for specific property distribution at divorce were 
considered against public policy and, therefore, unenforceable.7 Since that time, acceptance has 
become widespread and nearly all agreements are upheld by the court. For example, courts in 
Pennsylvania have established a strict freedom of contract philosophy which only authorizes 
non-enforcement when traditional contract defenses are proven.8  
 This rapid spread of acceptance resulted in standards which were far from uniform, 
making enforcement unpredictable and, thus, problematic. Therefore, in 1983, the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Premarital 
Agreement Act (UPAA). This act aimed to encourage enforcement while promoting the 
institution of marriage.9 It has since been adopted, in some form, by twenty-six states and the 
District of Columbia.10  
Morgan	  McAtamney	  
A40705737	  
2	  
	  
 The UPAA, seeking to reflect the standards of a majority of states, expressly established 
that prenuptial agreements involve special circumstances that are not implicated in traditional 
contract settings.11 Specifically, the uniform act incorporated the widely held belief that parties 
to such an agreement do not bargain at arm’s length and are uniquely likely to trust the 
information provided by the other party.12  The UPAA, thus, includes a requirement that spouses 
engage in full and fair disclosure of assets prior to signing a prenuptial agreement.13 However, 
disclosure is not required if the contesting party has constructive notice of the opposing party’s 
wealth or if there is an express, written waiver of disclosure.14 
 In addition to the disclosure requirement, the UPAA dictates two specific standards for 
policing prenuptial agreements.15 First, the agreement must have been voluntarily entered.16 
Though the voluntariness standard is not defined in the act, it has been interpreted in many states 
to include evidence of fraud, duress, or undue influence. Second, the agreement must not be 
unconscionable at signing, but will only be unenforceable if the disclosure requirement is also 
not satisfied.17 The practical result of the second requirement is that certain unconscionable 
agreements will be enforced if there was full and fair disclosure, if disclosure was waived, or if 
the contesting party had constructive notice of the opposing party’s assets.18  
 Though many states have adopted the UPAA, various modifications have been made to 
the uniform statute and, thus, standards still vary widely across jurisdictions. However, in a 
majority of these states, engaged couples are considered to be in a confidential relationship.19 
This relationship both justifies the disclosure requirement and creates a duty to “‘exercise the 
highest degree of good faith, candor, and sincerity in all matters bearing on … the proposed 
agreement, with fairness being the ultimate measure.’”20 However, even while recognizing that 
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parties stand in a confidential relationship, most courts require proof of substantial inequality and 
significant unfair bargaining tactics prior to refusing to enforce a prenuptial agreement.21  
 This refusal to acknowledge unfair tactics by individuals contemplating marriage has 
caused concern in recent years. Since the turn of the century courts and scholars have raised 
various concerns which will be analyzed below and have created several arguments for and 
against having a high standard for analyzing such agreements. 22 This discourse has resulted in 
three important changes in the law. This proposal will explain each in turn, will compare the 
results, and will ultimately recommend a solution which raises such agreements to a higher 
standard that serves to decrease inequalities in bargaining power and increase predictability. 
II. Concerns Raised by Current Standards 
 As stated above, it is almost universally accepted that prenuptial agreements are 
generated from unique relationships and, therefore, should be subject to different rules than 
traditional contractual relationships.23 In determining whether to enforce a prenuptial agreement, 
most states consider when the agreement was signed in relation to the date of marriage, whether 
each party had independent counsel, and other unique circumstances that may disproportionately 
influence signing in the analysis of voluntariness.24 However, these standards, while aiming to 
protect weaker parties, fail to adequately address inequalities of bargaining power, place the 
burden of avoiding the agreement on the weaker party, and generate incredibly high standards 
for involuntariness.25 
A. Inequality of Bargaining Power 
 The main concern presented by the current enforcement standards for prenuptial 
agreements is the utilization of one parties’ significantly increased bargaining power to induce 
unfavorable agreements. It is well established that most couples who sign prenuptial agreement 
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are on an unequal footing when it comes to the power to negotiate.26 And, as is even more 
concerning, prenuptial agreements tend to reach beyond what is necessary to protect a party’s 
interests.27 This is especially problematic as a significant majority of states do not require 
independent counsel or a knowledgeable waiver of rights in order to uphold a prenuptial 
agreement.28 
 At least a slight inequality of bargaining power is implicated in most relationships in 
which one party requests a prenuptial agreement.29 This is due to the nature of the agreements 
themselves. Specifically, these agreements are designed to protect a party whose assets grow 
disparately during marriage or whose assets are significantly larger than their significant other’s 
at marriage.30 In fact, the majority of individuals who request prenuptial agreements are those 
who have significant wealth, have already been divorced, and/or are marrying at an older age.31 
These individuals, logically, have both more experience with financial and legal matters and 
increased access to professionals who can provide advice and guidance than their significant 
others. Thus, they are able to create agreements that disproportionately benefit them and, as we 
will see, are uniquely equipped to ensure that their partners are aware of the consequences of 
such agreements. 
 In addition to these typical power arrangements, other unique, often problematic 
situations are presented in the context of prenuptial agreements. These include disparities in 
education and business knowledge, pregnancy, and immigration concerns.32 For example, in In 
re Marriage of Bonds, the California Supreme Court upheld a prenuptial agreement between 
baseball player Barry Bonds and his now ex-wife Susann (Sun) despite the fact that (1) Barry 
had significantly more assets and experience (both business and legal) than Sun, (2) Sun was not 
legally represented, and (3) English was not Sun’s native language.33 Despite the significant 
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disparity in resources and expertise, the court found that the agreement was entered into 
voluntarily and with reasonable disclosure of assets.34 In its decision, the court emphasized that 
Sun was clearly notified that this agreement was adverse to her statutory rights at divorce and 
that she and Barry had agreed to retain their separate property during marriage long before they 
were actually wed.35 
 Though such tactics may seem to be the exception, case law is filled with instances of 
unfair bargaining tactics.36 And, in most cases, courts across the United States will uphold these 
agreements while acknowledging the use of tactics to pressure the opposing party into signing.37 
For example, in In re Estate of Ingmand,38 the court explicitly acknowledged that the deceased 
husband’s actions in persuading his fiancé to sign the prenuptial agreement would likely be 
categorized as “unfair pressure tactics.”39 However, the court upheld the agreement, holding that 
such tactics “did not negate the knowing and voluntary nature of the execution.”40  
 This unique imbalance of power present in couples engaged to be married was 
acknowledged by the drafters of the UPAA.41 However, rather than addressing this issue by 
refusing to enforce unconscionable agreements, the majority of drafters insisted that the 
‘voluntariness’ requirement would ensure that weaker parties would be protected.42 However, 
many courts have found that, despite the existence of a confidential relationship between parties, 
any inappropriate pressure that does not amount to the traditional standards for duress or undue 
influence does not undermine the enforceability of such an agreement.43 Though this will be 
addressed in depth below, it is clear that, as neither the voluntariness standard nor the 
unconscionability standard adequately addresses the typical inequality of bargaining power 
present in parties to a prenuptial agreement, the current standards are inadequate.  
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B. Problematic Voluntariness Standards 
 As stated above, the issues created by disparate bargaining power are exacerbated by 
inconsistent and often inadequate standards for ‘voluntariness’. Neither the UPAA nor most state 
statutes expressly define the term voluntary.44 Some states have adopted a ‘totality of the 
circumstances’ test which includes an analysis of the situation surrounding the drafting and 
signing of the agreement.45 However, a large minority of states require evidence of the traditional 
contractual defenses of fraud, duress, or undue influence before establishing that the agreement 
was signed involuntarily.46 It is this significant disparity in standards, along with many courts’ 
attitudes regarding when such standards are met, that present significant problems.  
 States that have adopted the totality of circumstances test espoused in In re Marriage of 
Bonds, are clearly preferable to those which employ contract defenses. This is because the 
months leading up to marriage are not comparable to those leading up to a commercial contract. 
In Bonds, the court considered the parties’ bargaining power, evidence of coercion, the amount 
of time between signing and the wedding, the use of independent counsel, and the knowledge of 
the waiving party.47 However, these considerations still generally result in a finding of voluntary 
signature.48 For example, in Bonds, though the wife was not independently represented, signed 
the agreement the day prior to the wedding, had no business or legal expertise, and testified that 
she was unable to adequately understand the terms of the agreement, the court found no evidence 
that the document was signed involuntarily.49 
 Even more problematic, in jurisdictions that apply standards of fraud, duress, or undue 
influence, it is incredibly difficult to provide evidence that violates these standards. In fact, in 
order for circumstances to rise to this level, there typically must be evidence of a “wrongful or 
unlawful threat that gives the other party no reasonable alternative … [or] influence that deprives 
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a person of his or her freedom of choice.”50 Thus, because an individual always has the option 
not to marry, it is nearly impossible to prove that a signature was involuntary. However, courts 
often refuse to consider the substantial financial cost, embarrassment, and significant time 
expended when cancelling a wedding with such short notice. 
 Additionally, despite the difficulties of proving involuntariness, a majority of cases 
include evidence of substantial pressure to sign. For example, in Simeone v. Simeone,51 the wife 
(Catherine) and husband (Frederick) signed a prenuptial agreement limiting Catherine’s interest 
in property acquired during the marriage and any spousal support payments upon dissolution.52 
At the time of the marriage, Frederick was sixteen years Catherine’s senior, was employed as a 
neurosurgeon, and had assets totaling approximately $300,000.00.53 Catherine, on the other 
hand, was unemployed and had no assets to her name.54 One day before the couple was to be 
married, Frederick and his attorney presented Catherine with the agreement and threatened to 
call off the wedding if she refused to sign it.55 Catherine was not given any opportunity to 
consult with independent counsel nor was she advised of the legal rights she was agreeing to 
forego.56 Despite the timing of this presentation and Catherine’s lack of reasonable opportunity 
to review and/or negotiate terms, the court determined that her signature was voluntary.57  
 It is this case and many others like it that prove just how difficult it is to challenge a 
prenuptial agreement. Although the drafters of the UPAA believed that inequality of bargaining 
power and significant pressure to sign would be easily addressed under the ‘voluntariness’ prong, 
this has proved to be untrue.58 Regardless of the standards a jurisdiction implements, only a 
small minority allow the court to consider timing, lack of independent counsel, or lack of 
knowledge regarding what is being waived in an analysis of voluntariness.59 Thus, based on the 
inducement of his or her partner, an individual may be urged to sign an agreement he or she does 
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not understand without time to consider, opportunity to consult an expert, or the ability to 
negotiate terms. It is this lack of meaningful choice which does not render the agreement 
involuntary that makes the current voluntariness standards inadequate.  
C. Burden of Proving the Agreement is Unenforceable is on the Weaker Party 
 Finally, the current standards are problematic because they place the burden of 
challenging the agreement on the weaker party. As explained above, in most situations involving 
prenuptial agreements, there is a significant disparity in bargaining power between parties.60 This 
disparity often results in a weaker party being convinced to sign an agreement shortly before a 
costly wedding without really understanding what is being waived.61 Then, after being pressured 
into the agreement in the first place, the weaker party must provide evidence establishing these 
unfair bargaining tactics.62 However, this evidence generally comes in the form of testimony by 
the parties and their attorneys, if any. Clearly this presents significant complications in 
challenging an agreement, especially when combined with the high standards for voluntariness 
explained above. 
 This challenge, though, could be solved by imposing a standard of ‘utmost good faith’ 
required of parties who are in a confidential relationship. For example, in California, though 
engaged couples are not considered to be in a confidential relationship, once married, this 
changes.63 Based on this confidential relationship, courts impose a burden on the proponent of a 
marital agreements64 to establish that the agreement was not obtained through improper means.65 
 The placement of the burden on the stronger party is also present in other situations 
involving confidential relationships. For example, in Bonds, the California Court of Appeals 
acknowledged that, in traditional contracts in which parties are in a confidential relationship, 
there is a burden shifting arrangement which requires careful scrutiny of an agreement when one 
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party is unrepresented by counsel.66 Similarly, in the trust and estate context, most jurisdictions 
employ a burden shifting framework when analyzing whether a party exerted undue influence 
over an individual with which they had a confidential relationship.67 Finally, confidential 
relationships in business eliminate the traditional burden of discovery and create a duty on the 
opposing party to disclose all pertinent information.68  It is clear from these examples that, 
generally, confidential relationships create a framework for shifting burdens from the 
agreement’s challenger to the proponent in order to decrease disparities in bargaining power.69 It 
seems strange that, in a context that is plagued by unequal bargaining power and presents such 
unique circumstances, courts would not apply these same burden shifting frameworks available 
in the above situations. 
III. Arguments for a Higher Standard 
 Concern with current standards for policing prenuptial agreements suggests the need for a 
higher standard. The existence of unique relationships, lack of intelligent waiver, and promotion 
of public policy distinguish prenuptial agreements from ordinary contracts. Traditional 
contractual defenses are insufficient to protect parties to such a unique agreement. 
A. Unique Circumstances 
 As stated above, the prenuptial agreement context presents circumstances entirely 
different from those present in traditional contract settings. In addition to the natural inequality 
of bargaining power and the length of time between contracting and enforcement (if enforced at 
all), parties are uniquely unlikely to advocate for their best interests.70 This is because, unlike 
commercial contractual relationships, parties to a prenuptial agreement experience incredible 
optimism bias and are uniquely unaware of the rights being waived.71 
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 First, it is commonly acknowledged that, despite incredibly high divorce rates in the 
United States, most individuals severely discount the possibility of their own divorce.72 For 
example, a poll conducted in 2012 by Clark University revealed that 86% of 18-29 year olds 
believed that their marriage would last forever.73 In a similar study conducted by Heather Mahar 
of Harvard University, respondents estimated their chance of divorce at approximately 12%, 
significantly lower than the national divorce rate of 50%.74 This optimism bias has proven to 
reduce the likelihood of obtaining a prenuptial agreement in the first place.75 It is also likely a 
deterrent to adequately addressing concerns within the agreement itself. 
 In conjunction with the problem of optimism bias, parties contemplating marriage are 
generally unaware of their rights upon divorce.76 In fact, a study by Lynn A. Baker and Robert E. 
Emery in the mid-1990s established that recently married couples correctly stated the effects of 
divorce slightly more often than random chance would predict.77 This same survey was provided 
to approximately 100 law students, both before and after taking a basic family law course.78 
These results, though much more accurate than that of the general public, still displayed a highly 
inaccurate understanding of rights upon divorce.79 In fact, even after completing a family law 
course, only approximately 70% of the responses were correct.80 This clearly establishes that 
even the most educated and experienced couples contemplating marriage tend to be unaware of 
the rights they may waive by signing a prenuptial agreement. 
 It is the combination of this misplaced optimism and the lack of knowledge regarding 
rights that makes parties contemplating marriage uniquely unable to negotiate terms in prenuptial 
agreements. Unlike traditional contractual relationships in which parties can clearly identify what 
is and is not in their best interests, individuals who are simultaneously being pressured into 
signing an agreement they do not understand by a person they are expected to share the rest of 
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their life with and planning one of the most extravagant, expensive days of their lives, are 
unlikely to be able to negotiate a more favorable arrangement. In fact, all of these considerations 
have been acknowledged by a majority of jurisdictions, as evidenced by the recognition of a 
confidential relationship.81 However, most jurisdictions do not adequately enforce the standard. 
Confidential relationships require more than just simple good faith; they require the parties treat 
one another with the utmost good faith and impose a duty to act for the benefit of the other.82 
Choosing not to enforce these duties results in the imposition of incredible pressure and 
agreements that were not voluntarily signed.83 Therefore, though jurisdictions do attempt to 
acknowledge the unique relationship of parties to prenuptial agreements, the current standards 
are inadequate as they fail to address the existence of optimism bias and lack of knowledge 
regarding rights which is unique to this context.   
B. Ineffective Standards Regarding Knowledgeable Waiver 
 
 The absence of any duty in the part of the stronger party to explain the rights that are 
being given up undercuts the requirement of knowledgeable waiver. The disclosure requirement 
itself seems to be based on a policy to ensure knowledgeable waiver.84 This requirement, 
however, has been inappropriately limited to knowledge of the financial situation of the opposing 
party.85 This is problematic as it assumes that individuals are aware of the consequences of their 
agreement, an assumption that, as established by the research of Heather Mahar, Lynn Baker, 
and Robert Emery explained above, is wildly inaccurate.86 
 The current standards for prenuptial agreements do not ensure knowledgeable waiver. 
Such waiver be easily accomplished by enforcing the standard of ‘utmost good faith’ implicated 
in such a confidential relationship. For example, if parties were either required to obtain 
independent counsel or be advised in writing of the practical consequences of such an agreement, 
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for example the rights under the jurisdiction’s divorce statute which are being waived, courts 
could be confident that waivers are both knowledgeable and voluntary.87 Thus, public policy, 
which seems to support parties bargaining with full knowledge of the consequences of their 
actions, would be satisfied by the establishment of a slightly higher standard for prenuptial 
agreements. 
C. Promotes Public Policy Recognized in Analogous Circumstances 
 A higher standard for prenuptial agreements is also supported by policy preferences in 
similar legal circumstances. In particular, the policy against disinheriting spouses present in trust 
and estate contexts and the policy against taking advantage of weak parties present in the 
prevention of adhesion contracts offer useful insights into the commonly acknowledged rights of 
contracting parties in similarly special circumstances.88 Both the unique relationships and the 
inherent inequality of bargaining power between couples contemplating marriage seem to justify 
a higher standard in these analogous contexts and, therefore, these policies should be extended to 
the instant situation. 
1. Policy Preference Against Disinheriting Spouses 
 In a majority of jurisdictions, spouses are entitled to what is known as a ‘forced share’ of 
the deceased’s estate at death.89 The concept of the forced share entitles a spouse to a certain 
portion of the estate regardless of the existence of a will which states otherwise.90 This limit on 
the testamentary power of an individual has long been considered a “token of the solemnity of 
the matrimonial union,” and is considered to defend the public policy favoring spouses 
supporting one another even after the marriage ends.91  
 It is difficult to differentiate the policy preference for protecting spouses from contracting 
regarding rights upon death and those upon divorce. In fact, as previously explained, long prior 
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to allowing prenuptial agreement that contracted for rights upon divorce, prenuptial agreements 
were enforced when they contracted for rights upon death.92 Thus, it can be assumed that, despite 
the existence of forced share laws and the policy against entirely disinheriting spouses, it was 
believed that limiting rights upon death was considered more acceptable than upon divorce. It 
seems strange that the same courts that, for so long, favored limiting the rights upon death to 
those upon divorce would entirely eliminate this preference merely because there is no longer an 
absolute ban on prenuptial agreements regarding divorce. In fact, the first case to find a change 
in public policy expressly stated that contracts distributing marital property should be treated the 
same regardless of whether the marriage was to be terminated by death or divorce.93 In other 
words, the institution of marriage imposes a heightened requirement of support for one’s spouse 
which justifies a stricter review of any attempt to limit this responsibility at the conclusion of the 
marriage, whether by death or divorce.94 Therefore, public policy requires a heightened standard 
of review for prenuptial agreements based upon the unique rights and responsibilities inherent in 
a marital relationship. 
2. Policy Preference For Protecting Weak Parties 
 In other contractual relationships, courts have imposed protections for weak parties based 
on inequality of bargaining power.95 For example, typically in the context of insurance contracts, 
less sophisticated parties are allowed to defend against contracts if they are considered contracts 
of adhesion.96 Though prenuptial agreements do not quite rise to the level of adhesion contracts 
as they do not employ standard or boilerplate language, there are a fair number of comparisons 
that should justify extending the policy of protecting parties with less bargaining power to the 
prenuptial agreement context. 
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 An agreement is considered to have been signed involuntarily and, is thus, a contract of 
adhesion if it is a “standardized contract written entirely by a party with superior bargaining 
power … [and t]he weaker party … must "take it or leave it," and be without opportunity to 
bargain.”97 This is substantially similar to the situation present in prenuptial agreements. Though, 
as stated above, prenuptial agreements are unlikely to be considered ‘standardized,’ they do 
generally limit one party’s rights upon dissolution of marriage. Furthermore, these contracts are 
almost always categorized by a severe inequality of bargaining power and incredibly unattractive 
alternatives to signing.98 It is this discrepancy in bargaining power, inability to adequately 
negotiate, and the potential for a lack of alternatives that justify extending the widely accepted 
policy preference for “protect[ing] the subservient party … [and] insur[ing] equal protection and 
treatment under the law,” to the context of prenuptial agreements.99 Therefore, as in contracts of 
adhesion, prenuptial agreements should be subject to stricter scrutiny than traditional commercial 
contracts. 
IV. Common Criticisms of Higher Standard 
 Despite the common acknowledgement of unique concerns in the context of prenuptial 
agreements, some experts argue vehemently against a higher standard. These experts seek to 
avoid regulation, instead favoring only the employment of basic contract protections. The most 
compelling of these arguments rely on the parties’ freedom of contract, the desire for 
predictability, and the desire to escape gender bias. While all of these arguments seem to have 
some merit, they fail to adequately address the reality of prenuptial agreements and, therefore, 
are not sufficient arguments against a higher standard. 
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A. Freedom of Contract 
 The most obvious argument against regulating prenuptial agreements is that the state does 
not have the power to interfere with each individual’s freedom to contract. Proponents of this 
view argue that “[p]renuptial agreements are contracts, and, as such, should be evaluated under 
the same criteria as are applicable to other types of contracts.”100 This standard was adopted in 
Pennsylvania in Simeone v. Simeone. However, even the majority of Simeone itself 
acknowledges that parties contemplating marriage are not bargaining at arm’s length and, 
therefore, are not bargaining as traditional parties to a contract would.101 Furthermore, it is well 
established that marriage is an institution in which the state has great interest.102 This interest 
requires regulation of both entry and exit because families are considered to be the “building 
blocks” of society and protection and promotion of such associations is paramount to 
maintaining orderly communities.103 Therefore, the strict ‘freedom of contract’ argument does 
not adequately address the well-established concerns and policy preferences implicated in this 
context. 
 The policy preference for encouraging marriage has long been recognized in the United 
States.104 Marriage is seen to promote health and well-being, both physically and emotionally, 
for the entire family.105 In fact, the majority in Simeone states that, but for broad enforcement of 
prenuptial agreements, “[p]arties might not have entered marriages,”106 clearly suggesting that 
marriage is something to be promoted at all costs. Therefore, it is well established that the state 
has an interest in promoting marriage which has resulted in various regulations on the entry and 
exit. Any regulation of the entry of prenuptial agreements (on which marriages have traditionally 
been conditioned) is merely an extension of this interest. 
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 Furthermore, exclusive reliance on traditional contract regulations is misplaced. As 
analyzed above, prenuptial agreements are unlike traditional commercial contracts in that parties 
do not bargain at arm’s length, are in a unique trust relationship, typically have vastly unequal 
bargaining power, are distinctively unaware of the rights they are bargaining away, and 
genuinely believe that the bargained for terms will never be performed.107 Based on these five 
differences, it is disingenuous to maintain that parties are able to bargain in the same way they 
would in any other contractual context. Thus, when combined with the state’s established interest 
in marriage, it is clear that any comparison to traditional contractual relationships is misplaced. 
B. Predictability 
 Emerging from the freedom of contract justification is the policy argument emphasizing 
the importance of predictability for those drafting prenuptial agreements. Essentially, many 
proponents of broad enforcement suggest that, in order for prenuptial agreements to be worth 
drafting, parties must be able to predict whether or not they will be enforced upon divorce.108 
And, according to these individuals, the only way to ensure predictability is to guarantee broad 
enforcement.109 This is simply untrue. By creating a heightened standard that ensures fair 
negotiations through the recommendations explained below, predictability will increase but not 
at the expense of fairness.110  
 As previously stated, it is commonly acknowledged that prenuptial agreements typically 
involve parties of unequal bargaining power and, at least in certain circumstances, the imposition 
of pressure to sign such an agreement.111 It is the inconsistency in implementing well-established 
policy to protect individuals from unfair bargaining tactics and unreasonable agreements that has 
resulted in uncertainty of enforcement in the first place.112 However, rather than remedying 
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inconsistency, critics merely assert that predictability is more desirable than protecting 
vulnerable individuals, and, therefore, a higher standard is improper. 
 States need not be forced to choose either predictability or fairness. In fact, if a 
heightened standard (one that many states already claim to embrace) is enacted and certain 
requirements are imposed, predictability will easily be achieved. The standards recommended at 
the conclusion of this proposal create a set of conditions that, if satisfied, will establish that the 
parties bargained in good faith and, thus, that the agreement was voluntarily signed and is not 
unconscionable. There can be no question that such required conditions will both serve to 
promote predictability and good faith bargaining.  
C. Gender Bias and Paternalism 
 Finally, one of the primary justifications for the broad contractual freedom approach 
employed in Pennsylvania is that spouses are no longer “of unequal status” and that employment 
of a heightened standard for parties contemplating marriage would perpetuate “[p]aternalistic 
presumptions … [which] have, appropriately, been discarded.”113 This argument insists that all 
parties entering marriage are equal and any regulation of prenuptial agreements must necessarily 
be based on gender.114 Though it is true that women still primarily undertake family care of 
children, generate less wealth during marriage, and, thus, disproportionately benefit from these 
heightened standards, such realities do not “perpetuate gendered stereotypes about women and 
their ability to contract.”115  
 It is incredibly unwise to refuse to create standards to protect individuals with lesser 
bargaining power simply because these standards might disparately benefit one gender. In fact, 
not one statute currently employed to protect parties from unequal bargaining power allows 
consideration of gender.116 The fact that these statutes may disparately benefit women over men 
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stems from the fact that there remains an unequal proportion of women negatively affected by 
prenuptial agreements.117  
 Even Justice Papadakos of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in his concurrence to 
Simeone explained that his concurrence was written “because, it must be clear to all readers, [the 
majority opinion] contains a number of unnecessary and unwarranted declarations regarding the 
‘equality’ of women.”118 The opinion goes on to recognize the fact that gender inequality 
remains a problem to this day and that prenuptial agreements often involve parties of unequal 
bargaining power.119 Furthermore, Justice Papadakos refused to invalidate protections for 
subservient parties based on the fact that they, in many if not most circumstances, may benefit 
women.120 Ultimately, as the Simeone concurrence recognizes, the idea that the eradication of 
paternalism necessitates broad contractual freedom in prenuptial contexts fails to adequately 
recognize the realistic relationship of parties contemplating marriage and, therefore, is not a 
legitimate criticism to a heightened standard of review.121 
V. Three Proposed Solutions 
 In the years since the UPAA was drafted, several monumental cases (including some of 
the cases discussed above) have interpreted the various state statutes in unpredictable ways. In 
contrast to the expectation of the drafters of the UPAA, the voluntariness standard has not 
sufficiently protected parties with less bargaining power, a reality that has sparked significant 
criticism.122 This failure has resulted in several attempts to increase both predictability and 
protection. Three of these attempts will be explained below: the Uniform Premarital and Marital 
Agreement Act, California Family Code § 1615, and the American Law Institute’s Principles of 
the Law of Family Dissolution Chapter Seven. Each standard is increasingly strict. 
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A. Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreement Act 
 
 The Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreement act (UPMAA) was drafted by the 
Uniform Law Commission in 2012 and is considered the successor to the UPAA.123 As of March 
2015, only two states, North Dakota and Colorado, have enacted the UPMAA and one more, 
Mississippi, has proposed enactment.124 The UPMAA modifies the UPAA in that prenuptial 
agreements are unenforceable if (1) they are not signed voluntarily without duress, (2) either 
party did not have access to independent counsel, (3) there is no express notification of the 
waiver of rights, or (4) there has been inadequate financial disclosure.125 
 First, while the UPMAA is intended to modify the UPAA, the comments to Section 9 of 
the UPMAA expressly state that the “use of the phrase ‘involuntary or the result of duress’ in 
Subsection (a)(1) is not meant to change the law.”126 Therefore, it should be assumed that each 
state’s current case law regarding the voluntariness standard is to be retained and utilized to 
interpret the voluntariness of each parties’ signature.127 
 Second, though the language of the requirements seems to indicate that each party should 
be represented by independent counsel, the UPMAA goes on to define access very liberally. 
Under Section 9(b), each party has access to independent counsel provided that they have time to 
consider whether to hire counsel and to locate such an attorney and, if the other party is 
represented, have the financial ability to hire another attorney.128 Thus, the requirement of access 
to counsel is not sufficiently different from the standard currently used by many states. 
 Third, the UPMAA requires an explanation of waiver for parties not represented by 
independent counsel.129 This standard, however, merely requires the following recitation:  
If you sign this agreement, you may be: Giving up your right to be supported by 
the person you are marrying or to whom you are married. Giving up your right to 
ownership or control of money and property. Agreeing to pay bills and debts of 
the person you are marrying or to whom you are married. Giving up your right to 
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money and property if your marriage ends or the person to whom you are married 
dies. Giving up your right to have your legal fees paid.130 
 
Though this is a significant improvement from the lack of information required under the UPAA, 
it does not sufficiently explain the rights of the parties. It is unlikely that a party who is unaware 
of his or her rights and is unexperienced in legal matters would recognize the significance of this 
standard form waiver. It is similarly unlikely that this particular language would increase the 
understanding of his or her rights upon divorce. This standard language merely recites the 
possibility that rights are being waived without adequately explaining what these rights actually 
are or informing the party of consequences particular to the agreement itself. Therefore, it is 
questionable whether this would improve the protection of parties. 
 Finally, the act continues to require the disclosure of assets between parties.131 Though 
this does not seem to be a change from the UPAA, it is significant that the UPMAA no longer 
requires both unconscionability and lack of disclosure to overturn a voluntarily signed 
agreement.132 In fact, the UPMAA considers unconscionability as a wholly separate 
consideration from the four other factors.133 Therefore, though the UPMAA does take much 
needed steps toward increased protection for weaker parties, it does not seem to adequately 
address all the concerns proposed by critics of the UPAA. 
B. California Family Code Section 1615 
 Prior to the drafting of the UPMAA, the California legislature enacted California Family 
Code § 1615 which is more protective of weaker parties and allows for more predictability in 
enforcement. This statute was enacted in 2002 in response to In re Marriage of Bonds.134 It 
identifies five requirements for voluntariness.135 These requirements address (1) independent 
counsel, (2) timing, (3) explanation of terms and rights waived, (4) traditional contractual 
defenses, and (5) a catch-all provision.136 Only if all five are satisfied will the prenuptial 
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agreement be enforced.137 Though California still refuses to acknowledge a confidential 
relationship between parties to a prenuptial agreement, these new standards go a long way to 
protect parties with decreased bargaining power.  
 First, the California standard requires either independent counsel for both parties or a 
separate, written waiver of the same.138 This standard clearly satisfies the concern for both the 
inequality of bargaining power and the inability to negotiate meaningfully. Additionally, 
requiring a separate, written waiver of independent counsel following such a recommendation 
reduces arguments regarding whether or not such advice was actually given as well as increasing 
the likelihood that a weaker party will actually consider this advice. 
 Second, in order for the signature to be voluntary, the statute requires a seven day 
‘cooling off’ period between the final draft being presented and being signed.139 Thus, prenuptial 
agreements can no longer be forced on a party on the eve of the wedding. There must be at least 
a week in which the parties are able to consider their rights and alternatives. Furthermore, this 
requirement enables parties the time to obtain independent counsel if they so choose, something 
nearly impossible to do in one day. 
 Third, and most importantly, the California statute states that, if parties are not 
represented by independent counsel, the unrepresented party must be informed (in a written 
document that is in the language in which he or she is proficient) of the terms and effects of the 
contract as well as the rights being waived by signing.140  While still not fool-proof, this 
requirement greatly increases the chance that parties will be knowledgeable of their rights both 
under the contract and under the law of the state generally.  
 Finally, the fourth and fifth requirements represent the voluntariness standards in 
California and many other states prior to the enactment of this statute. As prenuptial agreements 
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are, at their core, contracts, regardless of any special circumstances present, the traditional 
contractual defenses of fraud, duress, undue influence, and lack of capacity and any other factors 
the court deemed relevant must be available to parties to prove that the agreement was 
involuntarily signed. Only the first three requirements represent significant changes in California 
law.  
C. American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution 
 
 Unlike the California statute and the UPMAA, the American Law Institute (ALI)’s 
proposed statute creates a presumption of informed consent and lack of duress if certain 
conditions are satisfied.141 Like the California statute, the Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution were drafted in 2002 and propose significantly stronger protections than the 
UPMAA.142 And, similar to the California statute, the ALI’s proposal contains requirements 
regarding (1) timing, (2) independent counsel, and (3) explanation of the terms and rights of the 
parties to the agreement.143 Finally, though it seems that the terms proposed by the ALI are 
stricter than those in California and the UPMAA, the fact that these trigger a presumption of 
enforcement rather than being required for enforcement makes it difficult to compare their 
strength.144 
 First, while California requires a seven day ‘cooling off’ period for couples, the ALI 
requires that thirty days have elapsed between the execution of the agreement and the date the 
parties’ marry.145 The practical application of this recommendation would require far more than a 
thirty day waiting period as, usually, parties do not contemplate, draft, and sign such agreements 
in the same day. Therefore, this condition is significantly stricter than that enacted in California. 
 Second, the ALI requires that both parties are advised to obtain independent counsel and 
have the ability to do so prior to signing the agreement.146 Unlike the other two factors, this 
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provision is actually weaker than the standard adopted in California. In fact, it is more 
comparable to the language employed in the UPMAA.147 There must, simply, be a 
recommendation of counsel and the time and ability to obtain said counsel in order for this factor 
to be satisfied.148 
 Third, like the UPMAA and the California Statute, the ALI requires that, if one party is 
unrepresented, the agreement must inform that party of his or her rights upon divorce, the nature 
of the waiver, and that the interests of the parties may be adverse.149 However, unlike the 
UPMAA, which requires very basic language be included, and the California statute, which fails 
to explain what would satisfy such a requirement, the ALI’s proposition includes illustrations 
that clearly establish this information must be detailed and written in a way that would be “easily 
understandable by an adult of ordinary intelligence with no legal training.”150 Therefore, it 
appears as though this too is a stricter requirement than those above. 
 Finally, unlike the UPMAA and the California Statute, the ALI does not require the 
above three conditions to be satisfied in order to enforce an agreement.151 Thus, such an 
agreement may not be enforced even if it does satisfy the conditions.152 Though this does 
increase the likelihood that only voluntarily and knowledgeably signed contracts will be 
enforced, it does decrease the amount of predictability available at the time of contracting. 
Therefore, depending on the interpretation of the state courts, it is questionable whether this 
proposal will result in stricter or more lenient enforcement of prenuptial agreements than the 
UPMAA or the California statute. 
VI. Analysis of Solutions and a Final Recommendation 
 The goal of this proposal is to demonstrate that parties to a prenuptial agreement, or any 
couples contemplating marriage, are in a unique relationship and, thus, these agreements should 
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be subject to higher scrutiny. Though a majority of states do consider parties contemplating 
marriage to be a confidential relationship, the practical result of this is merely that they must 
reasonably disclose their assets to the other party prior to signing a prenuptial agreement.153 
While a confidential relationship traditionally requires that parties must exercise “good faith, 
candor, and sincerity,” in negotiations with one another, courts consistently enforce agreements 
that are the result of unfair bargaining tactics.154 It is this standard of utmost good faith that 
should justify a higher standard of scrutiny for voluntariness.  
 In creating higher standards of voluntariness, it is useful to look at the conditions recently 
established by the UPMAA, California, and the ALI. As analyzed above, all three require 
varying degrees of protections for parties entering into prenuptial agreements. From these 
standards, three clear considerations have emerged: (1) measuring the time between signing the 
agreement and the wedding, (2) emphasizing access to independent counsel, and (3) including an 
explanation of the rights of the parties and the terms of the waiver.155  
 Requiring these three factors to establish voluntariness will serve to eradicate all concerns 
addressed above. Specifically, if a cooling off period, independent counsel, and communication 
of rights and consequences are required, then the concern regarding the inequality of bargaining 
power and the advantage and pressure of one party can no longer result in the substantial 
disadvantage of the opposing party. Additionally, these new factors would serve to enhance the 
predictability of enforcement. Therefore, by enhancing the scrutiny of these agreements and 
creating standards which would allow parties to survive such scrutiny, states will be able to 
ensure both that contracts are enforceable and that they are reasonable. 
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A. Timing 
 As stated above, one of the primary concerns of critics has been the incredible number of 
cases in which a party is presented with the agreement on the eve of the wedding.156 This, 
combined with many courts’ reluctance to prohibit enforcement for this reason alone, has 
resulted in many agreements being enforced despite the existence of “surprise pressure 
tactics.”157 By establishing some sort of timing requirement like those found in the California 
statute and the ALI Principles, this concern would be easily eliminated. 
  The ALI and California standards analyzed above establish very different measures for 
this waiting period. In California, parties to a prenuptial agreement must wait at least seven days 
between drafting and signing an agreement.158 This means that the agreement, while not 
presented immediately prior to the wedding, could be signed the day of the wedding.  
 The ALI, on the other hand, recommends that the agreement be signed thirty days prior to 
the wedding.159 While this seems to prevent parties from signing an agreement the day of the 
wedding, as explained above, this is not a precondition to enforcement as it is in California.160 
Therefore, the agreement could easily be signed the day of the wedding provided that the 
signature was not the result of duress. This presents significant problems in its own right 
because, as explained much earlier, a finding of duress typically requires an unlawful threat 
which does not include pressuring a party to sign an agreement the day before the wedding.161 
Thus, it is clear that both solutions still present problems and some change to these standards is 
necessary. 
 The solution to this problem seems to be to combine the strengths of the two approaches. 
In other words, as in California, the waiting period must be a mandatory precondition to 
enforcement and, as in the ALI, the period should be measured between the signing of the draft 
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and the date of the marriage. Obviously the longer the waiting period, the more protective the 
statute will be. However, as explained in detail below, stricter independent counsel requirements 
should also serve to protect parties from being pressured to sign an agreement, and, therefore, the 
waiting period need not be long. Therefore, as it is a strict requirement and it is unnecessary to 
lengthen this period, a seven day waiting period between drafting and signing and another seven 
day waiting period between signing and marriage should be sufficient.   
B. Independent Counsel or Knowledgeable Waiver 
 Along the same lines as the timing concerns, one of the pressing problems in the field of 
prenuptial agreements is the inability to meaningfully negotiate terms without the presence of or 
access to independent counsel.162 In fact, it is widely acknowledged that the meaningful 
opportunity to obtain independent counsel significantly increases the likelihood that parties both 
understand and assent to the terms of the agreement.163 The UPMAA, California Statute, and 
ALI Principles all include an independent counsel requirement.164 However, only one of these 
solutions adequately ensures each party’s right to independent counsel.  
 Both the UPMAA and the ALI require that parties have the opportunity to obtain legal 
counsel if they so choose.165 While each does provide additional protections,166 these protections 
do not seem to protect individuals any more than the current state statutes do. The California 
statute, on the other hand, does provide one significant requirement that seems to increase the 
protection of weaker individuals and provides objective evidence of compliance with these 
requirements. There, the statute requires that parties either obtain independent counsel or sign a 
separate, written waiver of the same.167 While it is apparent that simply writing and signing 
documents without legal counsel does not conclusively establish that the waiver of counsel was 
voluntary or knowledgeable, this procedural safeguard is far more reliable than simple verbal 
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recommendation and waiver. Therefore, though it is significant that all three proposed solutions 
above include some level of access to independent counsel, imposing the California requirement 
of either independent counsel or separate, written waiver of the same provides an additional 
safeguard with only minor cost and inconvenience to the parties and, thus, is the recommended 
standard here. 
C. Disclosure of Rights and Consequences  
 Finally, as explained above, one of the unique problems with prenuptial agreements is the 
parties’ lack of knowledge regarding their rights upon divorce and the consequences of the 
agreement.168 And, as in the independent counsel standards above, all three proposed solutions 
contain terms regarding plain language explanations of rights of the parties and terms of the 
agreement for unrepresented parties.169 However, it is unclear exactly what such a disclosure 
would look like and how protective this standard would ultimately be.  
 Though the UPMAA, California Statute, and ALI Principles all contain substantially 
similar language regarding this disclosure of rights, it is clear that they do not all require the 
same level of detail and protection. First, though the California statute does not contain 
comments or illustrations of such a disclosure,170 it seems to be the most protective as it requires 
that the disclosure (1) be in the plain language of the unrepresented party and (2) be provided to 
the party in a separate, written document.171 As explained above, providing such information in a 
separate writing provides both additional protection for the weaker party and establishes 
importance and predictability in enforcement because it is objective evidence, unlike the 
testimony of the parties. Furthermore, unlike the UPMAA, which seems to principally protect 
native English speakers, the California statute and ALI Principles require the disclosure to be in a 
language easily understandable to the unrepresented party.172  
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 Second, though the California statute and the ALI clearly require detailed disclosure 
which is specific to the particular prenuptial agreement in dispute, the UPMAA requires only a 
standard notice of waiver of rights.173 This language, which was quoted in full above, is not 
dependent on the language of the agreement or the laws of the particular state in which the 
parties’ are to be married.174 The ALI, on the other hand, contains explicit illustrations which 
establish that such a waiver would be insufficient to satisfy the disclosure requirement.175 In fact, 
these illustrations seem to require a detailed description of both the rights of the parties upon 
divorce in the state in which they are to marry and how the agreement modifies these rights.176 It 
is clear that such an explanation would both significantly decrease parties’ disparities in 
bargaining power and increase the predictability of enforcement. However, the use of a 
standardized ‘waiver of rights’ as provided for in the UPMAA would not improve the knowledge 
of the parties as it does not explain rights upon divorce and it not specific to the agreement 
between the parties. Therefore, the use of such a boilerplate disclosure is unlikely to remedy any 
of the problems discussed in depth above. 
 The proposed change to the rules is, therefore, a combination of the California statute and 
the ALI Principles. In order to properly remedy the problematic lack of knowledge of parties to 
prenuptial agreements, there must be a separate disclosure of each party’s rights upon divorce 
and the effect of the agreement. This disclosure should be written in plain, easily understood 
terms in the language primarily spoken by the unrepresented party. Such a disclosure will both 
protect the interests of the unrepresented party and promote predictability in the enforcement of 
the agreement. 
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VII. Conclusion 
  The concerns expressed in this paper have gradually been gaining acceptance over the 
decades since the UPAA was enacted. This is evidenced by the fact that the ALI, the Uniform 
Law Commission, and various state legislatures have begun modifying the standards for 
enforcing prenuptial agreements. However, there is still a significant conflict between the 
policies supporting the protection of individuals with disparate bargaining power and that of the 
freedom to contract. In order to adequately balance these concerns, the proposal advocated here 
combines the various standards established by the UPMAA, California legislature, and the ALI. 
Ultimately, the solution involves (1) a timing requirement in which parties must draft the 
agreement at least seven days prior to signing and sign at least seven days prior to the wedding, 
(2) an independent counsel requirement or the separate, written waiver of the same, and (3) a 
disclosure requirement which details both the rights of the parties upon divorce in the state in 
which they currently reside and the effect of the terms of the agreement in the primary language 
of the unrepresented party. The combination of these three requirements would significantly 
decrease use of unfair bargaining tactics without excessively burdening the party with superior 
bargaining power. 
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